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BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: 
ASIAN REGIONALISM, THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AND U.S.-CHINA 
TRADE RELATIONS 
Jiangyu Wang* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the interactions of power politics and 
international economic law in the development of regionalism in 
Asia, particularly in the context of United States-China trade 
relations.  It argues that the process of regional economic 
integration in Asia has been slow-moving because of the 
politicization of regionalism by power rivalries.  China’s initial 
regional integration initiatives apparently ignored the United 
States, a superpower which has always been a major player in Asia 
and an indispensable part of the region’s economic process.  The 
United States-led Trans-Pacific Partnership was allegedly designed 
to exclude China, Asia’s largest economy.  On the other hand, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership also spurred the effects of competitive 
liberalization, pushing China to deepen its economic reform 
domestically and engage its trading partners on friendlier terms at 
regional and international levels.  The demise of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership does not amount to the death of its cutting-edge rules.  
Those rules have laid a solid foundation for developing high-
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standard template agreements for Free Trade Agreements of the 
next generation, and many of them are likely to be incorporated 
into an upgraded multilateral trading system.  United States’ 
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership offers a golden 
opportunity for Asian countries to establish a real Pan-Asia free 
trade area through the negotiations for the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, but in the long run, 
regional integration in Asia should look beyond Asia and include 
the economies of the American side of the Pacific for both 
economic and strategic reasons.  The Article concludes with a few 
suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regional/Free Trade Agreements (“RTAs” or “FTAs”) are 
the talk of the town in the Asia-Pacific.1  On October 5, 2015, 
twelve Pacific Rim countries, led by the United States (“U.S.”), 
announced the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPP”),2 which was signed 
on February 4, 2016.3  U.S.’ involvement in the TPP, however, 
was terminated by Donald J. Trump, America’s newly-elected 
president, while it was waiting for ratification (mainly by the U.S.) 
to enter into force.4  Meanwhile, the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (“RCEP”), another mega-trade agreement, 
has been negotiated by the ten members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) and its six FTA partners 
since 2012.5  Additionally, in 2012, the Chinese Communist Party, 
the ruling party of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or 
“China”), announced at its 18th Party Congress that China would 
                                                          
1 Preferential trade agreements are usually called FTAs by countries 
negotiating and signing them, but the World Trade Organization officially uses 
RTAs. See Regional Trade Agreements, WTO (Sep. 1, 2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.html. 
2 Jessica Glenza, The TPP deal: US and 11 other countries reach 
landmark Pacific trade pact, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/05/trans-pacific-partnership-
deal-reached-pacific-countries-international-trade.  
3 Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal signed in Auckland, BBC NEWS 
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35480600.  
4 In November of 2017, the other eleven members of the TPP agreed to 
continue the TPP without the U.S. The new pact is called the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. See Lee U-Wen In 
Danang, Trans-Pacific Partnership deal moves ahead without US, STRAITS 
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), http://www.straitstimes.com/world/tpp-deal-moves-
ahead-without-us.   
5 REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP), 
ASEAN, http://asean.org/?static_post=rcep-regional-comprehensive-economic-
partnership (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
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“accelerate implementation of the strategy of building free trade 
areas.”6 
 
The TPP (and its possible successor Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans-Pacific Parnternship (“CPTPP”)), RCEP, and 
China’s enhanced FTA programme are landmark developments in 
the ongoing economic regionalism in Asia.  Regionalism, known 
as regional economic integration, is a process that brings the 
markets of countries—usually, but not always, in the same 
region—together to achieve free movement of goods, services, 
capital, labor, and possibly other economic factors of production 
through intergovernmental initiatives, mainly including FTAs.7  
Richard Pomfret notes that there have been three waves of 
regionalism since the inception of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in 1947.8  The first wave started in 
Europe in the 1950s when six Western European countries began 
to work on regional economic integration, which led to the 
establishment of a customs union in the 1960s.9  The second wave 
of regionalism was initiated by the bilateral and regional trade 
negotiations in North America, which resulted in the establishment 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) in 
1993.10  We are now, however, witnessing the third wave of 
regionalism that emerged in the early 2000s, which, for the first 
                                                          
6 Hú Jǐntāo (胡锦涛) [Hu Jintao], Hújǐntāo Zài Zhōngguó 
Gòngchǎndǎng Dì Shíbā Cì Quánguó Dàibiǎo Dàhuì Shàng de Bàogào (胡锦涛
在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告) [Hu Jintao at the Eighteenth 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China Report], PEOPLE’S DAILY 
(May 1, 2017), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151.html 
(emphasis added).  
7 See Jiangyu Wang, China, India, and Regional Economic Integration 
in Asia: The Policy and Legal Dimensions, 10 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 269, 269-70 
(2006). 
8 Richard Pomfret, Is Regionalism an Increasing Feature of the World 
Economy?, 30 WORLD ECON. 923, 924 (2007); see generally Theresa Carpenter, 
A Historical Perspective on Regionalism, in MULTILATERALIZING 
REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 13 (Richard 
Baldwin & Patrick Low eds., 2009). 
9 Pomfret, supra note 8, at 924-25. 
10 Id. at 925. 
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time, now focuses on East Asia, “partly stimulated by a perception 
that the global economic institutions let the region down in the 
1997 Asian Crisis and partly by the increase of China’s economic 
power.”11  
 
Regionalism in East Asia has its early initiatives dating 
back to two decades ago, marked by the formation of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (“AFTA”) in 1992.12  The AFTA, however, could 
not be taken as the serious beginning of this region’s 
regionalization as its performance was rather “dismal”13 and “had 
minimal economic impact.”14  As such, “[b]efore 2000, 
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region was distinguished by its 
absence.”15  
 
Regional economic integration in Asia was accelerated 
when China, followed by Japan, Korea, and other countries, 
jumped on the bandwagon.  China kicked off the current wave of 
economic regionalism in Asia by proposing the ASEAN-China 
Free Trade Agreement (“ACFTA”) in 2000, which was quickly 
followed by the conclusion of a Framework Agreement with an 
Early Harvest Programme in 2002, and the formation of a full 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area in 2010.16  In the decade after the 
ACFTA Framework Agreement, Asian negotiators had witnessed 
the competition between the ASEAN+3 model endorsed by China 
                                                          
11 Id.  
12 See Rahul Sen, “New Regionalism” in Asia: A Comparative Analysis 
of Emerging Regional and Bilateral Trading Agreements involving ASEAN, 
China and India, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 553, 554 (2006); see generally Tan, Lay 
Hong & Samtani, Anil The Shifting Paradigm in Regional Economic 
Integration: The ASEAN Perspective, TLH02/02 (Aug. 22, 2002), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=325484. 
13 Tan & Samtani, supra note 12, at 1.  
14 RICHARD POMFRET, REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA: WHY HAS IT 
FLOURISHED SINCE 2000 AND HOW FAR WILL IT GO? 25 (World Sci. 2011). 
15 Id. 
16 See generally Jiangyu Wang, China’s Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) Approach: the Law, the Geopolitics and the Impact on the Multilateral 
Trading System, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L LAW 119 (2004). 
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and the ASEAN+6 model favored by Japan.17  While it was still 
believed by many in Asia that economic integration would 
eventually be achieved through the adoption of either of the two 
models, the emergence of the TPP put both aside, at least for a few 
years until Donald J. Trump signed an executive order to pull his 
country out of the TPP in his first week as the 45th President of the 
United States.18 
 
For the Asians, regional integration makes sense both 
economically and geo-strategically.  A report of the Asian 
Development Bank (“ADB”) suggested that “[r]egional 
cooperation, effectively structured and implemented, is a powerful 
new tool in Asia’s policy arsenal.  It can help Asia address regional 
challenges as well as provide stronger foundations for its global 
role.”19  But, major Asian economies, including China, Japan, 
Korea, and the ASEAN countries, were already busy with 
negotiating and concluding FTAs of their own before regional-
level integration achieved some meaningful progress.  When 
national ambitions and regional ideas are intertwined, the 
regionalization process is inevitably complicated by national 
interests, nationalist sentiments in historic and contemporary 
bilateral relations, and power politics. 
 
On the other hand, regional integration is also necessarily a 
legalization progress.  Through FTAs, countries establish rules and 
standards to govern their external economic relations, and agree to 
bind themselves to legal obligations under international economic 
law.  As observed by Joel Trachtman, “[r]egionalism presents 
many faces to the international economic law system.  Regional 
                                                          
17 Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Multilateralizing Regional 
Trade Arrangements in Asia, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM: 
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 495, 500-504 (Richard 
Baldwin & Patrick Low eds., 2009). 
18  David Smith, Trump withdraws from Trans-Pacific Partnership amid 
flurry of orders, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:46 EST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/23/donald-trump-first-orders-
trans-pacific-partnership-tpp.  
19 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, EMERGING ASIAN REGIONALISM: A 
PARTNERSHIP FOR SHARED PROSPERITY 13 (2008). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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integration creates international economic law subsystems.”20  A 
particular model of bilateral or regional economic arrangements, 
once it is codified into RTAs/FTAs as such part of international 
economic law, will impose constraints on state behavior.  That is 
probably why, knowing the consequences of legalization, none of 
the major economies in Asia would easily subscribe to the regional 
integration model proposed by others given their complicated 
bilateral relations as well as each country’s peculiar relations with 
the U.S.  The “battle of models” leaves ample space for power 
politics, as there is little doubt “the prevailing great powers at this 
historical moment are keen to use legal rules and institutions to 
advance their interests and institutionalize their power,”21 both 
regionally and globally.  Thus, Asian regionalism is one of the best 
examples through which one can investigate “the role of law in 
shaping international politics,” “the role of politics in shaping 
international law,”22 and the possibility of using international 
economic law to limit injurious power politics. 
 
This Article looks at the interactions of power politics and 
international economic law in the development of trade 
regionalism in Asia in the context of U.S.-China trade relations.  It 
argues that the process of regional economic integration in Asia 
has been rather slow because of the politicization of Asia 
regionalism by power rivalries.  China’s initial regional integration 
initiatives apparently ignored the U.S., which has always been an 
indispensable part of the economic processes in Asia.  The U.S.-
led TPP was allegedly designed to exclude China, the largest 
economy in Asia.  On the other hand, the TPP also spurred the 
effects of competitive liberalization, pushing China to deepen its 
economic reform domestically and engage its trading partners on 
                                                          
20 Joel Trachtman, International Trade: Regionalism, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 151, 151-52 (Andrew T. 
Guzman & Alan O. Sykes eds., 2007). 
21 A.M. Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, in 
L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE [THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] RECUEIL DES COURS 285 (2000) [COLLECTED COURSES 
285 (2000)] 199 (2001). 
22 Id. at 198. 
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friendlier terms at regional and international levels.  Further, the 
demise of the TPP does not also mean the death of its cutting-edge 
rules.  Many of those rules are likely to be incorporated into other 
new generations of FTAs or even the multilateral trading system if 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is upgraded to a second 
version.  Consequently, China must prepare itself for meeting the 
high-standards of TPP-style agreements at some point in the future.  
It is further argued that U.S.’ withdrawal from the TPP offers a 
golden opportunity for Asian countries to establish a real Pan-Asia 
free trade area through the negotiations of the RCEP, but in the 
long run, regional integration in Asia should look beyond Asia to 
include the economies of the American side of the Pacific for both 
economic and strategic reasons.  
 
The Article is organized as follows.  Part I analyzes the 
early stage of regionalism in East Asia, which started at the turn of 
the 21st century, focusing on the China-Japan-U.S. rivalries in the 
competition for regional integration models.  Part II examines the 
rise and demise of the TPP.  Part III discusses the impacts of the 
TPP on U.S.-China trade relations and Asian regionalism.  Part IV 
discusses the ongoing fundamental changes in U.S.-China trade 
relations in the Post-TPP Trump Era.  Lastly, Part V concludes 
with some policy recommendations.  
I. CHINA’S EARLY PARTICIPATION AND THE CHINA-
JAPAN RIVALRY IN EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 
A. East Asian Regionalism and China’s Early Participation 
As noted previously, regionalism in East Asia arguably 
dates back to the 1992-established AFTA, although this was not a 
serious beginning of regional integration as the AFTA has not even 
realized meaningful free trade within ASEAN, let alone generating 
impact at the Pan-Asian level.23  At the end of the 1990s, highly 
trade-dependent countries in ASEAN, most notably Singapore, 
began to look at FTAs in response to regional and global economic 
                                                          
23 See supra notes 12-15 & the accompanying text. 
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events that included the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, the 
collapse of the WTO’s meeting in Seattle, and China’s anticipated 
accession to the WTO.  Singapore and Japan established a Joint 
Study Group to examine the feasibility of a bilateral FTA in 
December 1999, which led to the signing of the Japan-Singapore 
Economic Partnership Agreement (“JSEPA”) in January of 2002.24  
 
The landmark regional integration initiative that kicked off 
this wave of regionalism in Asia was the ASEAN-China FTA 
(“ACFTA”), which was surprisingly proposed to ASEAN 
countries by the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at the ASEAN-
China Summit in November of 2000.25  An expert group was 
quickly formed to examine the feasibility of such a FTA, and 
negotiations commenced in 2001.26  In November of 2002, China 
and ASEAN countries were able to sign a Framework Agreement 
for the ACFTA.27  The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, which is 
based on a range of agreements between China and ASEAN on 
trade in goods, services, investments, and other matters, came into 
being on January 1, 2010, as the world’s biggest regional trade 
deal measured by population and third largest by nominal GDP.28 
 
Arguably, it was the ACFTA that triggered the new wave 
of Pan-East Asian regionalism.  China was the first country that 
entered FTA relations with ASEAN.  The ACFTA set the 
framework and precedent for the FTAs that ASEAN signed with 
                                                          
24 See Press Release, Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Entry into 
Force of the Agreement Between Japan and Singapore for a New Age Economic 
Partnership (Oct. 31, 2002) (on file with the Singapore Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs). 
25 See Wang, supra note 16, at 124. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Andrew Walker, China and Asean free trade deal begins, BBC (Jan. 1, 
2010, 12:33 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8436772.stm; see 
generally Mohamed Aslam, The Impact of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 
Agreement on ASEAN’s Manufacturing Industry, INT’L J. CHINA STUD., Apr. 
2012, at 43; see generally SARAH Y. TONG & CATHERINE CHONG SIEW KENG, 
CHINA-ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA IN 2010: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE (E. 
Asian Inst. of Nat’l Univ. of Sing. ed., 2010). 
9
ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2018  12:27 PM 
392 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 2N 
Korea in 2007, Japan in 2008, and Australia, New Zealand, and 
India in 2009.29  In Asia, China, Japan, and Korea were newcomers 
to regionalism, but the ASEAN+1 FTAs signed by them show that 
“the three major East Asian countries have undergone a strategic 
policy change from favoring the multilateral approach for global 
free trade to actively participating in regional grouping in order to 
regain their growth momentum after the [Asian Financial 
Crisis]”.30  In tandem with pursuing the ACFTA, by 2010, the 
number of FTAs China concluded totaled ten, with economies like 
Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Hong Kong, 
Macau, Taiwan, and Costa Rica.31 
B. Politicized East Asian Regionalism: China-Japan Rivalry for Regional 
Leadership 
From the very beginning of this regional economic 
integration wave, Asian countries were struggling with identifying 
the geographic coverage of the economic regionalism, out of, 
however, mainly geopolitical concerns.  Several regional grouping 
ideas were proposed but favored by different major powers in the 
region.  China initially indicated its willingness to negotiate a 
trilateral FTA among China, Japan, and South Korea.32  The 
concern for strong domestic opposition within the three Northeast 
countries led them to agree that ASEAN was the ideal center to 
hold East Asia together, which led to the idea of an ASEAN+3 
model of regionalism.33  The ASEAN+3 FTA was officially 
                                                          
29 In the case of the ASEAN-Japan FTA, it was noted that “[p]rompted 
by the China + ASEAN framework agreement, Tokyo followed suit.” See 
Khairy Tourk, The Political Economy of East Asian Economic Integration, 15 J. 
ASIAN ECON. 843, 857 (2004). 
30Jong-Wha Lee & Innwon Park, Free Trade Areas in East Asia: 
Discriminatory or Non-discriminatory?, 28 WORLD ECON. 21, 23 (2005). 
31 See Jiangyu Wang, China and East Asian Regionalism, 17 EUR. L. J. 
611, 613 (2011). 
32 Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 17, at 501. 
33 Id. n.9 (indicating that Japan was “cautious about [a China-Japan-
Korea FTA] at this stage” officially because Japan wanted China to demonstrate 
its compliance with its WTO obligations).  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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proposed by China,34 and favored by South Korea and ASEAN, at 
least initially.35 
 
The ASEAN+3 model of regional cooperation commenced 
when China, Japan, and South Korea were invited to the informal 
ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in December of 1997 amid the Asian 
Financial Crisis.36  Since then, numerous inter-governmental 
initiatives were developed under the umbrella of ASEAN+3, 
including the rather successful regional financial cooperation in 
Asia that produced the Chiang Mai Initiative, which is Asia’s only 
regional liquidity support arrangement, the regional economic 
surveillance process, and the Asian bond market.37  It was also the 
model envisaged by the East Asian Vision Group in its 2001 
report, which recommended the establishment of an East Asian 
Free Trade Area (“EAFTA”) embracing the ASEAN+3 grouping.38 
 
China has been a firm supporter of the EAFTA and East 
Asia’s regional integration, on the condition, however, that it is 
                                                          
34 Id. 
35 Tourk, supra note 29, at 858. In January 2018, China has concluded 
16 FTAs and is engaging in negotiations for 11 other FTAs. See CHINA FTA 
NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 
2018). 
36 Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, ASEAN+3 Or ASEAN+6: 
Which Way Forward? 6 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Discussion Paper No. 77, 
2007), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156716/adbi-dp77.pdf.  
37 Id.  
38 EAST ASIAN VISION GROUP, TOWARDS AN EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY: 
REGION OF PEACE, PROSPERITY AND PROGRESS 3 (2001), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf.  
11
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based on the ASEAN+3 model.39  With its rapidly growing 
economic might, China seemed to be confident that a “10+3” FTA 
would eventually run in China’s favor and strengthen China’s 
dominance in the region, even though Japan and Korea were 
economically much more developed than China.40  China’s 
enthusiasm for this model was, however, well received by 
ASEAN, and was written into a Joint Declaration signed by the 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the heads of the ten ASEAN 
governments in October of 2003, based on which, China and 
ASEAN agreed to “[m]ake the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism as 
the main channel to move forward cooperation and regional 
economic integration in East Asia as a whole so as to promote 
                                                          
39 See ZHANG YUNLING, CHINA AND ASIAN REGIONALISM 8 (2010) 
(indicating “China takes ‘10+3’ . . . as the core course for EAC [East Asian 
Community]”); see also 10+3 Hézuò 20 Zhōunián: Mài Xiàng Dōngyà Jīngjì 
Gòngtóngtǐ, Wàijiāo Bù Huíyīng (10+3合作20周年：迈向东亚经济共同体，
外交部回应) [The 20th Anniversary of the 10+3 (ASEAN+3) Cooperation: 
Comment of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Path to East Asian 
Community], CANKAOXIAOXI.COM (June 25, 2017), 
http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/china/20170625/2145968.shtml (indicating that 
“the ‘10+3’ model is the main avenue for East Asian cooperation, and the main 
platform for establishing an East Asian regional economic community” and that 
“China has always attached high degree of importance to and always 
enthusiastically supported and participated in the ‘10+3’ model of cooperation”). 
40 See Wáng Jiāngyǔ (王江雨) [Wang Jiangyu], Yàzhōu Jīng Jǐ Yītǐ 
Huà de Géjú, Luàn Jú Héjiě Jú (亚洲经济一体化的格局、乱局和解局) [Asian 
Economic Integration: State of Affairs, Messy Situation, and Solutions], CAIJING 
MAGAZINE (Nov. 28, 2015), 
http://comments.caijing.com.cn/20151128/4020687.shtml (indicating that China 
believed this model was in its best interest because (1) this model is relatively 
smaller in size than other models and as such is more manageable and less risky; 
(2) it can exclude suspicious countries such as India and Australia; and (3) 
China is confident that it is only a matter of time before it will inevitably play a 
dominate role in this region as its economic and comprehensive powers continue 
to grow). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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sustainable development and common prosperity there.”41  Ever 
since, Chinese delegates have tried hard to sell the ASEAN+3 
model to other East Asian countries.42 
 
Japan initially supported the idea of ASEAN+3, but quickly 
backed down from it.43  Instead, Japan proposed a bigger regional 
deal, or the ASEAN+6 grouping, which converts ASEAN+3 to a 
larger trade block to include Australia, New Zealand, and India.44  
The China-Japan rivalry appeared to be more visible in 2004 and 
2005.  ASEAN leaders, through a suggestion of the East Asian 
Vision Group, agreed in November of 2004 to convene an East 
Asian Summit (“EAS”).  The first EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur 
on December 14, 2005.45  Arguments about who to invite between 
China and Japan preceded the Summit.  “China favored a guest list 
limited to ASEAN+3.  Japan, seeking counterweights to China’s 
influence, argued successfully for Australia, India, and New 
Zealand to be included.”46  The EAS has since become a pan-Asia 
forum for the sixteen countries, known as the ASEAN+6 forum.47  
                                                          
41 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Joint Declaration of 
The Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
and the People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity (May 11, 2012), http://asean.org/?static_post=external-relations-
china-joint-declaration-of-the-heads-of-stategovernment-of-the-association-of-
southeast-asian-nations-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china-on-strategic-
partnership-for-peace-and-prosp. 
42 See, e.g., Zhōngguó Zhīchí Dōngméng Zhǔdǎo “10+3” Jīngjì Hézuò 
(中国支持东盟主导‘10+3’经济合作) [China Supports ASEAN Playing the 
Leading Role in the “10+3” Model of Economic Cooperation], SINA (Aug. 25, 
2006), http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2006-08-25/09199847099s.shtml [hereinafter 
China Supports 10+3].  
43 Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja noted Japan’s cautious 
attitude towards the ASEAN+3 FTA proposed by China: “[Japan’s] official 
view is that, before negotiating an FTA/EPA, China must clearly demonstrate 
that compliance with all the commitments made in WTO accession 
negotiations.” See Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 17, at 501. 
44 Id. 
45 POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 96-97; see also Masahiro Kawai, Evolving Economic 
Architecture in East Asia 22 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Discussion Paper No. 84, 
2007), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156723/adbi-dp84.pdf.  
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No agreement, however, was reached to accommodate Russia’s 
membership in the EAS, albeit Russia’s request was supported by 
China and India.48  
         
Obviously, Australia, New Zealand, and India were brought 
into the EAS to check the growing influence of China, despite 
China’s Premier Wen Jiabao’s call that East Asian regionalism 
should be “led by the East Asian countries.”49  In that sense, the 
first EAS “can be seen as a significant setback for Chinese 
diplomacy.”50  On the other hand, China’s lack of interest in 
participating in negotiations for an ASEAN+6 based 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (“CEPEA”), 
proposed by Japan in 2006 as a counter-proposal to China’s idea of 
an ASEAN+3 FTA, was one of the main reasons that the 
ASEAN+6 regionalism made little progress between 2007 and 
2009.51  At that time, the politicization of regionalism turned 
economic integration in Asia into word games.  “It is now 
understood that the core of East Asian cooperation lies in ASEAN 
as the ‘driving force,’ with ASEAN+3 as the ‘main vehicle’ for the 
realization of an eventual East Asian economic community, with 
the EAS as ‘an integral part of the overall evolving regional 
architecture.’”52  In other words, regional economic integration 
conducted by Asians themselves stalled at that time, thanks to the 
lack of East Asia’s indigenous leadership because of the China-
Japan rivalry. 
                                                          
48 POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95. 
49 Philip Bowring, Opinion, Towards an “Asian Union,” N.Y. TIMES 
(Jun. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/18/opinion/philip-bowring-
toward-an-asian-union.html. 
50 Id.  
51 As noted previously, China always believed that ASEAN+3 (10+3) 
was the major channel to the realization of regional economic integration in 
Asia, and was suspicious of accepting Non-East Asian members, such as 
Australia and India into the regional integration circle in East Asia. See supra 
notes 34-37 & the accompanying texts. On the other hand, it was also pointed 
out that other members’ lack of interest in ASEAN+6 was because of “Japanese 
reluctance to open its market to sensitive imports.” See POMFRET, supra note 14, 
at 97. 
52 Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 17, at 509. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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C. The Role of the United States in Asian Regionalism: Indifference, 
Exclusion and Responses 
There were generally two concerns about Asian 
regionalism when it started in the 2000s.  The first was the 
conventional unease with regionalism’s negative impact on global 
trade liberalization, much discussed in the literature on 
regionalism.53  The second is related to U.S.’ involvement in Asia.  
Asia’s new regionalist proposals, be it an ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 
FTA, share a common feature: the exclusion of the U.S., which is 
historically and practically an Asian power.  In the China-Japan 
rivalry, Asian countries once debated about whether to invite 
Australia, New Zealand, India, and even Russia to the club, but the 
U.S. was not considered to be part of the economic integration 
process in Asia.  As Fravel and Samuels observed in 2005, “most 
of the partnerships exclude the United States altogether—and more 
are being formed every year.”54 
        
The lack of participation by the U.S. was nevertheless 
largely self-chosen exclusion.  In part because it was preoccupied 
with the War on Terror, and in part because it was not interested in 
the shallow integration projects in Asia, the U.S. “showed less 
concern about East Asian regionalism in the early 2000s than it 
had in the 1990s.”55  As observed by Takashi Terada:  
 
The United States had never been 
interested in participating in any East 
Asia (as opposed to Asia-Pacific) 
regional institution until Barack 
Obama assumed office in January 
2009 and subsequently declared 
himself “America’s first Pacific 
                                                          
53 See NAOKO MUNAKATA, TRANSFORMING EAST ASIA: 
THE EVOLUTION OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 15 (2006). 
54 Taylor Fravel & Richard J. Samuels, The United States as an Asian 
Power: Realism or Conceit?, MIT CTR. INT’L STUD.: AUDIT OF CONVENTIONAL 
WISDOM 2 (2005).  
55 POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95. 
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President.”  One of the first steps the 
Obama administration took in regard 
to regional engagement was to sign 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
(TAC) in July 2009, fulfilling the 
only precondition for official EAS 
participation that had not previously 
been met by the United States.56 
 
However, with China’s rapid rise in the region, America’s 
original indifference gradually turned into anxiety and even “fear 
of exclusion,” particularly with respect to the escalation of the 
ASEAN+3 framework to the level of a summit like the EAS.  As 
Naoko Munakata noted: 
 
Another of Washington’s concerns, 
expressed in mid-2004, was that the 
idea of a separate East Asia summit 
circulating at the ASEAN+3 
meetings was designed to enhance 
the influence of China.  Because the 
decision to hold the summit was 
made somewhat abruptly and 
difference of its purpose and that of 
the existing ASEAN+3 leaders 
meeting was not made clear, some 
suspected that the true aim might be 
to exclude US influence in the region 
and China might use it as a forum to 
dominate the region.57 
 
Responses from the U.S. are threefold. First, senior 
officials signified warnings to Asian countries, especially 
                                                          
56 Takashi Terada, ASEAN Plus Three: becoming more like a normal 
regionalism?, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN REGIONALISM 364, 371 
(Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs eds., Routledge 2012). 
57 MUNAKATA, supra note 53, at 16. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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American allies in the region, that regional integration in Asia was 
marching toward an unwelcome direction without U.S.’ 
involvement.  Beginning in 2004, U.S. senior officials expressed 
concerns about Asia’s regional progress without American 
involvement.58  Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in August of 
2004 in Tokyo, urged Asian countries not to participate in Asia-
only forums “in a way that undercuts the very, very fine and strong 
relations that the United States has with each and every one of our 
friends in Asia.”59  It was suspected in the U.S. that China’s goal 
for promoting regionalism was to exclude America from Asia. 
Richard Armitage, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, warned 
before the first EAS that such a forum “would exclude the United 
States, which China was particularly enthusiastic about.”60 
         
Second, in light of the view that a China-dominated 
regionalization project might have excluded the U.S. as the 
objective, the U.S. lobbied Japan, its most important ally in Asia, 
not to endorse China’s proposal for an EAS, which was part of the 
reason Japan withdrew its initial backing of the ASEAN+3 
model.61  Still in favor of Asian regionalism, Japan counter-
proposed the ASEAN+6 framework to introduce Australia, India, 
and New Zealand into the circle of Asian countries to dilute 
Chinese influence.62  More significantly, “a greater weight of 
democratic countries with market-based economies might make 
the grouping more acceptable to the USA.”63  
         
Third, the U.S. endorsed, albeit a bit unofficially, the idea 
of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (“FTAAP”) under the 
umbrella of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”), an 
                                                          
58 Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning Staff at the State 
Department, remarked in November of 2004 in Tokyo that “while we encourage 
greater integration, greater economic development, greater dialogue among all 
the countries of this region, we don’t want to be excluded from that 
conversation.” Fravel & Samuels, supra note 54, at 2. 
59 MUNAKATA, supra note 53, at 191. 
60 Id. 
61 POMFRET, supra note 14, at 95. 
62 Id. at 96. 
63 Id. 
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ideal so inclusive that most of the countries along the Pacific Rim 
would be embraced.  The APEC, spear-headed by Japan and 
Australia, had its first meeting in November of 1989, and it was 
attended by the finance ministers from twelve Asian-Pacific states 
with the clear absence of China (China later became an APEC 
member in 1991).64  The idea of the FTAAP has its origin in a 
recommendation of the APEC Business Advisory Council 
(“ABAC”) in a study report of an Asia-Pacific-wide FTA, 
commissioned by APEC leaders in 2004 and 2005.65  APEC 
leaders were initially unenthusiastic about the FTAAP, but the U.S. 
changed its attitude in 2006 and began to promote the FTAAP as a 
base agreement for the vast Asia Pacific region.66  
         
According to Fred Bergsten, the former Director of the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, the former 
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs of the U.S. Treasury, 
and Chairman of APEC’s Eminent Persons Group for trade policy 
strategy, an FTAAP would be a “Plan B” to get world trade policy 
back on track in view of the ailing Doha Round negotiations of the 
WTO.67  Further, given the disturbance caused by the explosion of 
FTAs in Asia and elsewhere, “one of the key advantages of the 
FTAAP is that it would sweep together the smaller deals already in 
place and head off those that will otherwise ensue.”68 
         
                                                          
64 See Nick Bisley, APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, in 
MARK BEESON & RICHARD STUBBS, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN 
REGIONALISM 350, 351-53 (2012). 
65 Robert Scollay, Professor of Economics, Presentation at ISEAS 
Seminar: A Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP)? Rational and 
Feasibility (Mar. 19, 2007), https://www.pecc.org/resources/publications/trade-
and-investment/2028-a-free-trade-area-of-the-asia-pacific-ftaap-rationale-and-
feasibility/file; see also Fred Bergsten, Toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific, PB07-2 PETER G. PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. 1 (2007), 
https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb07-2.pdf. 
66 Id. 
67 Fred Bergsten, Plan B for world trade, FIN. TIMES (Aug.15, 2006), 
https://www.ft.com/content/390d8cec-2c82-11db-9845-0000779e2340. 
68 Id.  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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More significantly, the FTAAP would successfully address 
the exclusion of the U.S. from Asian regionalism and alleviate the 
play of geopolitics by the major powers in the region through 
trans-Pacific economic cooperation.  For this, Bergsten lucidly 
wrote: 
 
[An] FTAAP would embed these 
Asia-only arrangements in a broader 
Asia-Pacific framework.  It would 
prevent the creation of a new 
division across the Pacific, with its 
adverse security as well as economic 
consequences for relations between 
east Asia and the US.  The US and 
China would be the natural leaders of 
an FTAAP process and could 
simultaneously improve the 
prospects for resolving their bilateral 
trade tensions through such a 
regional framework.69 
 
Arguably, the FTAAP proposal by the U.S. in 2006-2007 
offered an opportunity for China, Japan, and other Asia economies 
to welcome the U.S. to the newly-developed Asian regionalism.  
After all, even from a realist perspective, the U.S. has been the de-
facto leading power in Asia Pacific, as well as one of the largest 
markets and sources of investment and technology for many Asian 
countries.  It has also been the only guarantor of peace and stability 
in Asia.  However, Asian regionalism’s existing players, including 
both China and Japan, did not show much enthusiasm in it.70  
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 China expressed skepticism about the FTAAP in Hanoi in 2006, 
citing two concerns that included the adverse effect on the WTO’s Doha Round 
and a delay in implementing the APEC’s Bogor goals. It was however noted that 
China’s main concerns lie in promoting its own bilateral and regional deals 
including the ASEAN+3 FTA. Japan agreed to support the FTAAP along with 
its own ASEAN+6 deal, indicating its preference lied in the ASEAN+6 model. 
See Bergsten, supra note 65, at 1-3. 
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China continued to voice its firm commitment to the ASEAN+3 or 
“10+3” style of regional economic integration in Asia for years 
after the FTAAP proposal was circulated.71  A year later, the U.S. 
activated its mega-FTA project, the TPP, which has aroused more 
intensified power politics in Asia and essentially divided Asia and 
stalled its indigenous economic integration process.  But even in 
2010, when the TPP negotiations already entered a substantive 
stage, Chinese officials were still trying hard to sell the ASEAN+3 
FTA idea to other Asian governments.  Yi Xiaozhun, China’s 
Deputy Commerce Minister, indicated in an ASEAN media 
conference that the “conditions are virtually mature” for an 
ASEAN+3 free trade area: 
 
Since 2005, the studies for a “10+3” 
FTA have been conducted for five 
years.  . . .  I think the conditions are 
ripe for accelerating regional 
integration in East Asia. We should . 
. . firmly make the East Asian 
Community the long-term goal of the 
“10+3” cooperation, support the core 
leadership role of the ASEAN in the 
“10+3” and East Asia integration 
process.  All the governments 
concerned should fully use the 
“10+3” as the main vehicle to 
steadfastly build the “10+3” FTA in 
accordance with the research results 
and the recommendations about the 
“10+3” FTA, which will eventually 
be followed by the full realization of 
East Asian economic integration if 
                                                          
71 See Zhōngguó Zhīchí Dōngméng “10+3” Jīngjì Hézuò Jìnchéng（中
国支持东盟“10+3”经济合作进程） [PRC Ministry of Commerce: China 
Supports the ‘10+3’ Model of Economic Integration Led by ASEAN], CHINA 
NET (Aug. 25, 2006), 
http://www.china.com.cn/economic/zhuanti/chinaeast15/txt/2006-
08/25/content_7256804.htm. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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we proceed based on the principles 
of “doing the easies things first” and 
“doing things gradually.”  . . .  We 
stick to open regionalism . . . and 
will not form a self-insolated or 
exclusive group.  . . .  However, we 
will expand the scope of regional 
integration in Asia only after we can 
make substantial progress on the 
“10+3” FTA.72 
 
This telling statement, in stark contrast with the words of 
Bergsten, showed that China was still unwavering in promoting an 
ASEAN+3 FTA, apparently excluding the official presence of the 
U.S. in the process, despite the signs that Asian regionalism was 
already being shaped—largely by the TPP—in a direction not in 
China’s favor in the way ahead. 
II. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE TPP 
When the TPP negotiations were concluded and the final 
text was reached by the twelve Pacific Rim states on October 5, 
2015, it was immediately recognized as the “largest regional trade 
accord in history,” with its members representing roughly 40 
percent of global GDP and one-third of world trade.73  Mighty as it 
                                                          
72 Jiāqiáng Qūyù Hézuò, Gòng Chuàng Měihǎo Wèilái-yì Xiǎo Zhǔn 
Fù Bùzhǎng Zài Dì Sān Jiè 10+3 Méitǐ Hézuò Yántǎo Huì Shàng de Jiǎnghuà (
加强区域合作，共创美好未来-易小准副部长在第三届10+3媒体合作研讨
会上的讲话) [Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Creating a Bright 
Future for All of Us – Speech of Deputy Minister of Ministry of Commerce at the 
Third Workshop on ‘10+3’ Media Cooperation], MINISTRY OF COM.: PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (May 22, 2017), 
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/af/ak/201004/20100406881614.shtml.  
73 Kevin Granville, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Accord 
Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/business/international/the-trans-pacific-
partnership-trade-deal-explained.html?_r=0. The twelve countries are Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
United States, and Vietnam. Id. 
21
ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2018  12:27 PM 
404 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 2N 
might have sounded, the TPP has a rather humble origin.  Known 
originally as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, it 
was conceived by three small economies—Singapore, New 
Zealand, and Chile—in 2003, and concluded by these three 
countries together with Brunei in 2006 when it was called the 
Pacific 4, or P-4 agreement.74  
        
The U.S. entered talks with the P-4 countries on 
liberalization in financial services and investment in March of 
2008.75  President George W. Bush, not long after his call for 
“serious consideration” to the FTAAP,76 notified Congress of his 
intention to participate in TPP negotiations in November and 
persuaded Australia, Peru, and Vietnam to join with the U.S. in 
December of 2008.77  The Obama Administration waited until 
November of 2009 to commit the U.S. to continue with TPP 
negotiations “with the goal of reshaping a regional agreement that 
will have broad-based membership and high standards worthy of a 
21st-century trade agreement.”78  The nine negotiating parties, led 
by the U.S., jointly issued a statement at the 2011 APEC Leaders 
Meeting in Honolulu to announce their vision to make the TPP “a 
comprehensive, next generation regional agreement that liberalizes 
trade and investment and addresses new and traditional issues and 
21st-century challenges.”79  With the accession of Canada, Mexico, 
and Japan in the following years, the total number of TPP members 
reached twelve in 2013.80 
         
The final text of the TPP agreement, signed by the twelve 
parties in February of 2016, comprises of 30 chapters, which deal 
not only with traditional trade issues, such as market access for 
goods, rules of origin, customs administration, trade remedies, 
                                                          
74 IAN FERGUSSON, MARK MCMINIMY & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) 
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2015). 
75 Id. 
76 Bergsten, supra note 65, at 1. 
77 FERGUSSON, MCMINIMY & WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 1. 
78 Id. at 3. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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technical barriers, investment, services, and intellectual property 
rights (“IPRs”), but also cutting-edge issues such as e-commerce, 
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), regulatory coherence, 
enforceable labor and environmental rules, as well as “other policy 
areas that are less obviously associated with trade or trade 
barriers.”81  
         
It is helpful to briefly summarize the content of the TPP 
agreement here.  On market access, approximately 99 percent of 
the tariff lines for trade in goods will be duty-free once the TPP 
would take effect.82  The liberalization on trade in services is, if not 
revolutionary, at least tremendous, not only because it follows the 
“negative-list” approach.  Exceptionally, it generally prohibits the 
requirement for local presence of service suppliers.83  On 
investment, it establishes strong protection for investors based on 
the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, and creates an Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) for private investors to seek 
arbitration against host states.84  On intellectual property rights, the 
level of protection goes significantly beyond the current WTO 
provisions in Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”) Agreement (e.g., copyright increased from 50 years to 
70 years).85  On digital trade and e-commerce, TPP members are 
prohibited from setting up barriers to block cross-border flows of 
data over the internet.86  The chapter on State-Owned Enterprises 
(“SOE”) offers an operational definition on SOE as well as 
disciplines regarding transparency, non-discrimination, 
                                                          
81 Daniel Ikenson et al., Should Free Traders Support the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership? An Assessment of America’s Largest Preferential Trade 
Agreement 2 (Cato Inst., Working Paper No. 39, 2016). 
82 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement ch. 1, Feb. 4, 2016, Off. of 
U.S. Trade Representative., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter TPP]. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. ch. 9.  
85 Id. ch. 18; see also Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299. 
86 TPP, supra note 82, ch. 14. 
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commercial consideration, and general prohibition on 
government’s commercial assistance.87  TPP’s labor and 
environmental rules require the adoption and enforcement of laws 
in line with relevant international labor standards and 
environmental agreements.88  Finally, the TPP establishes a 
simpler institutional structure that includes a dispute settlement 
mechanism with only one panel process to reach the final award.89 
         
However comprehensive and significant it may be, the 
U.S.-led TPP is now dead as a result of President Trump’s 
executive order to pull the U.S. out of it.  The Presidential Order 
indicated the rationale for abandoning the TPP was because the 
agreement did not meet “the intention of [the Trump] 
Administration to deal directly with individual countries on a one-
on-one (or bilateral) basis in negotiating future trade deals.”90  The 
United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) was directed “to 
withdraw the United States as a signatory to the [TPP], to 
permanently withdraw the United States from TPP negotiations, 
and to begin pursuing, wherever possible, bilateral trade 
negotiations to promote American industry, protect American 
workers, and raise American wages.”91  However, this move was 
interpreted by The New York Times as President Trump’s signal 
“that he would not follow old rules, effectively disregarding 
longstanding Republican orthodoxy that expanding global trade 
was good for the world and America – and that the United States 
should help write the rules of international commerce.”92  
                                                          
87 Id. ch. 17. 
88 Id. ch. 19; id. ch. 20. 
89 Id. ch. 28.  
90 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, Donald J. 
Trump, President of the United States, The White House (Jan. 23, 2017) (on file 
with WhiteHouse.gov). 
91 Id. 
92 Peter Baker, Trump abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s 
Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-
nafta.html?_r=0. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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III. IMPACTS OF THE TPP ON U.S.-CHINA TRADE 
RELATIONS AND ASIAN REGIONALISM 
A. Containing China Through a Trade Agreement? 
Not surprisingly, news on the conclusion of the TPP 
negotiations triggered extensive media coverage and heated 
debates worldwide, to some degree because China was excluded 
from the mega-regional deal.  This author has observed elsewhere 
how the TPP is perceived within China: 
 
Among Chinese experts, there exist 
various opinions in regard to both the 
perceived effects of the TPP 
agreement itself and the process by 
which parties to the agreement were 
chosen.  Some believe that the TPP 
is a strategic exercise by the United 
States to try to “contain” China’s rise 
in economic power and geopolitical 
influence.  Others have concerns as 
to whether the TPP represents a 
threat to the position of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) as the 
standard-bearer of global trade rules.  
Still some view the agreement 
optimistically, believing this could 
be a stimulus for China’s further 
integration into the world 
economy.93 
 
Media in the U.S. has not been shy about the strategic nature of the 
TPP.  In criticizing presidential candidate Trump’s trade policy, 
The New York Times lamented: 
 
                                                          
93 Jiangyu Wang, Decoding the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Will the 
U.S.-led trade agreement pose a threat to China?, BEIJING REV. (May 20, 
2017), http://www.bjreview.com/World/201510/t20151026_800041255.html. 
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The agreement, known as TPP, was 
intended to play a strategic role in 
American diplomacy.  It was the 
economic linchpin of Mr. Obama’s 
effort to reaffirm the nation’s role as 
a Pacific power and counter the 
rising influence of China, which was 
not part of the negotiations.  
Washington’s abandonment of the 
pact is widely seen in the region as a 
blow to American prestige and an 
opening for China to negotiate trade 
rules, win friends among Asian 
nations and assert regional 
leadership.94 
 
There are, however, two ways to look at the TPP insofar as 
its impact on China is concerned.  As noted, many, if not most, 
Chinese and international commentators believed that the TPP was 
used by the U.S. to contain China.95  For those observers, the TPP 
was simply a geopolitical tool to limit China’s influence in the 
region for the following reasons.  
 
First, China’s absence from the TPP as the largest economy 
in Asia and second largest economy in the world would make the 
trade agreement economically much less sensible.  Clearly, a 
regional-level FTA would be much more meaningful economically 
by including China.  Studies on the economic effects of the TPP by 
Petri, Plummer, and Zhai suggested that “the greatest economic 
benefits were associated with agreements that spanned China and 
                                                          
94 A Retreat from TPP Would Empower China, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/opinion/a-retreat-from-tpp-would-
empower-china.html.  
95 See, e.g., Cai Penghong, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Chinese 
Perspective, PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION COUNCIL (Oct. 4, 2011), 
https://www.pecc.org/resources/trade-and-investment-1/1752-the-trans-pacific-
partnership-a-chinese-perspective-ppt/file (stating that “[i]t seems that U.S. is 
using the TPP as a tool as part of its Asia Pacific Strategy to contain China”). 
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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the United States.”96  For instance, it was estimated—calculated 
through an advanced computable general equilibrium (“CGE”) 
model—that “expanding the TPP from 12 to 17 members [to 
include China, Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand] 
would triple global benefits from 285 to 893 billion in U.S. dollars 
in 2025.”97  Specifically: 
 
1. Adding China to a 16-member 
TPP increases global benefits 
from $451 to $1,908 billion per 
year, or from 0.4 percent to 1.8 
percent of world GDP.  China’s 
benefits account for 2/3 of these 
changes, as Chinese gains 
increase from -$82 billion under 
the TPP16 (suggesting trade 
diversion losses) to $809 billion.  
These and other values are for 
2025 relative to baseline 
projections, expressed in billions 
of 2007 dollars.  
 
2. Every TPP16 economy benefits 
from adding China.  The gains 
are roughly three times as high as 
under the TPP16 for Australia 
and the Americas.  Gains more 
than double for Japan, Korea and 
Singapore.  Smaller increments 
are estimated for Asian middle-
income economies which are 
more competitive with China.  
Substantial additional losses are 
calculated for Taiwan, Hong 
                                                          
96 Peter Petri, Michael Plummer & Fan Zhai, The TPP, China, And 
FTAAP, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 78, 81 
(Tang Guoqiang & Peter A. Petri eds., E.-W. Ctr. 2014). 
97 Id. at 83. 
27
ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2018  12:27 PM 
410 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 2N 
Kong and the ROW, economies 
excluded from the TPP17. 98 
 
Hence, one would be curious about how the TPP members were 
selected.  If it was about the members’ stage of economic 
development on the presumption that the higher the members’ 
developmental level, the more likely for them to conclude a high-
quality FTA, then China was obviously better positioned in this 
regard than some other TPP members, such as Vietnam and, 
arguably, Malaysia.  On this basis, the fact that China was 
excluded must find its answer in geopolitics, not common 
economic welfare for the region. 
 
Second, the numerous statements, speeches, commentaries, 
and analyses from official and private sources in the U.S. 
overwhelmingly suggested that the TPP represented a strategic 
move to counterbalance and restrict China’s rising influence in 
Asia.  Aston Carter, Obama’s Defense Secretary, famously 
remarked that “in terms of our rebalance in the broadest sense, 
passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft,” because 
“[i]t would deepen our alliance and partnerships abroad and 
underscore our lasting commitment to the Asia-Pacific.  And it 
would help us promote a global order that reflects both our 
interests and our values.”99  President Barak Obama also constantly 
maintained that the TPP dealt a way for the U.S. to “write the 
                                                          
98 Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer & Fan Zhai, China in the TPP, 
ASIAN-PACIFIC TRADE (Feb. 4, 2014), http://asiapacifictrade.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Adding-China-to-the-TPP-4feb14.pdf. 
99 Ash Carter, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Remarks on the Next Phase of the 
U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, Speech Before the McCain Institute, 
Arizona State University (April 6, 2015) (transcript available on the Dep’t of 
Def. website), https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-
View/Article/606660/remarks-on-the-next-phase-of-the-us-rebalance-to-the-
asia-pacific-mccain-instit/. 
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rules” for Asia-Pacific and reassert primacy over China.100  In an 
op-ed he wrote for The Washington Post urging U.S. Congress to 
pass the TPP, President Obama emphasized the geopolitical nature 
of the agreement as follows: “The world has changed.  The rules 
are changing with it.  The United States, not countries like China, 
should write them.  Let’s seize this opportunity, pass the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and make sure America isn’t holding the bag, 
but holding the pen.”101 
 
The logic and need to hedge against China with the TPP, 
from the perspective of many American politicians and 
commentators, would sound simple and powerful.  Since the TPP 
is an agreement to check China’s power, its failure would mean a 
huge defeat to the U.S. and benefit only China, America’s primary 
geopolitical competitor.102  It was imagined that, without the TPP, 
Beijing would dictate policy and make rules for Asia.103  
Indubitably, the views based on this logic have been made 
understood (or misunderstood) in China and planted seeds of 
mistrust as to the U.S.’ intention behind the TPP. 
 
                                                          
100 Jerry Seib, Obama: If We Don’t Write Trade Rules, China Will, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/video/obama-if-we-dont-
write-trade-rules-china-will/2E2F928C-1747-435D-9CAB-
EB3346FDEEB9.html; see also Ikenson, supra note 81; David Francis, Obama: 
Failure to Pass TPP Benefits Beijing, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/16/obama-failure-to-pass-tpp-benefits-
beijing/; Nathan Vanderklippe, TPP Deal a Way for U.S. to Reassert Primacy 
over China, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tpp-deal-a-way-for-us-to-
reassert-primacy-over-china/article26660167/. 
101 Barack Obama, President Obama: The TPP would let America, not 
China, lead the way on global trade, WASH. POST. (May 2, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-
america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-
11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html?utm_term=.015159983ea4. 
102 Roger Cohen, If the Trans-Pacific Partnership Crumbles, China 
Wins, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/the-right-asian-deal-trans-pacific-
partnership.html (“If T.P.P. falls apart, China wins. It’s as simple as that.”).  
103 Id. 
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One may argue that the above statements and speeches 
should be read with contextual considerations.  After all, they 
might only carry sensitivity for an American audience in the 
context of American politics.  For example, President Obama, 
because of the significant opposition he faced domestically, might 
find naming China as a convenient strategic move to win over 
American voters, especially when Donald Trump’s critique of 
U.S.’ trade policy toward China garnered massive support in the 
American public.  This, arguably, did not necessarily mean the 
Obama Administration sought to contain China with the TPP.  This 
argument, however, does run against the third reason why the TPP 
is believed by many Chinese as a geopolitical tool against China, 
which has much to do with the agreement’s rules.  In today’s 
international trade, China is well-positioned at the central place in 
the global supply chains as a major manufacturing center, now 
producing about one-quarter of global output, largely thanks to 
China’s ability to match developing-world labor costs with world-
class infrastructures.104  Nevertheless, the TPP might aim to 
deprive China of its position as a global production hub, or at least 
undermine it.  As pointed out by the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, one of the key features of the TPP is its “regional 
approach to commitments.”105  That is, the TPP was intended to 
facilitate “the development of production and supply chains, and 
seamless trade,” among others, implicitly within the areas 
connected and covered by the TPP.106  
 
The objective of establishing regional production and 
supply chains within the TPP area was designed to be achieved, in 
part, through a system of stringent rules of origin, which requires 
that only “originating goods,” or goods genuinely produced by 
TPP members, could receive the lower tariffs or other benefits in 
                                                          
104 The Future of Global Supply Chains: Insights from a CFR 
Workshop, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.cfr.org/report/future-global-supply-chains. 
105 Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Summary of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative (May 22, 
2017) (on file with author).   
106 Id.   
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accordance with the TPP.107  Under the concept of cumulation, 
TPP members would treat materials from one TPP member in the 
same way they treat materials from any other TPP member when 
these materials are used to make a TPP product.108  As noted by the 
USTR, the “cumulation” rule “strengthens incentives for TPP 
businesses to integrate production and supply chains within the 
TPP region, making it more attractive to do business with 
producers in the U.S. and other TPP countries than with producers 
in other countries.”109  
 
The threat to Chinese exports was especially vivid with 
regard to textile trade, for which the TPP adopts a “yarn forward” 
rule of origin, requiring the end product to use yarns and fabrics 
from TPP countries in order to qualify for preferential treatment 
under TPP.110  Currently in the American market, China and 
Vietnam are the two largest sources of imports for garment and 
footwear.111  Yet Vietnam’s textile industry heavily relies on 
importing raw materials from China.  In 2014, it imported 4 billion 
in U.S. dollars worth of fabrics from China, about a half of its total 
annual imports.112  The “yarn forward” rule, however, would 
mandate Vietnam to cut back on imports from China, thus 
                                                          
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 TPP, supra note 82, ch. 3; Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures 
Chapter Summary, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Rules-of-Origin-and-
Origin-Procedures.pdf (last visited May 21, 2017). 
110 Textiles and Apparel Chapter Summary, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (last visited Mar. 25, 2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Textiles-and-
Apparel.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2018); see TPP, supra note 82, ch. 4, art. 4.2. 
111 See 2016 Nián Yuènán Zài Měiguó Chéngyī Jìnkǒu Shìchǎng de 
Zhànyǒu Lǜ Shàngshēng (2016年越南在美国成衣进口市场的占有率上升) 
[Vietnam’s Shares in US Garment and Footwear Market Increased in 2016], 
SHANGHAI INT’L COTTON EXCH. (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://www.cottonsh.com/news!show.action?id=7b1f45e92ac54183a402b9bbb4
a4ecb3 (reporting that China’s market share was 41.5% and Vietnam’s was 
12.45% in the garment and footwear markets in the U.S.). 
112 Id. 
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diverting Vietnam’s sourcing of yarns and fabrics from China to 
TPP countries, hopefully the U.S. and Mexico.113 
 
Some TPP rules, especially those concerning free flow of 
information on the internet and establishment of independent trade 
unions, challenge the authoritarian nature of China’s political 
system on certain highly politically sensitive issues.  This 
challenge, intentionally or unintentionally (from the American 
perspective), creates barriers that prevent China from joining the 
TPP in the capacity of an authoritarian state with socialist market 
economy.114 
                                                          
113 Tom Wright & Mark Magnier, Fabric of a Trade Deal: U.S. Asks 
Vietnam to Cut Out Chinese Textiles, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2015, 6:28 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fabric-of-a-trade-deal-u-s-asks-vietnam-to-cut-out-
chinese-textiles-1435125498. 
114 For instance, the TPP’s “Electronic Commerce” Chapter requires a 
TPP member to ensure free flow of the global information and data. See TPP, 
supra note 82, ch. 14. “Each Party shall allow the cross-border transfer of 
information by electronic means.” Id. ch. 14, art. 14.11. It also prohibits any 
party to require business to locate computing facilities in its territory “as a 
condition for conducting business in that territory,” among others. Id. ch. 14, art. 
14.13. These requirements run directly against Chinese laws and regulations 
such, as the PRC Cyber Security Law that took effect on June 1, 2017. See  
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Wǎngluò Anquán Fǎ (中华人民共和国网络安
全法) [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), 
WWW.LAWINFOCHINA.COM [hereinafter PRC Cybersecurity Law]. China’s 
notorious Great Firewall, an internet technological system of limiting access to 
foreign websites, has been used to block foreign web domains or even particular 
pages with websites which contain “harmful” foreign content from being 
accessed by residents in China. See E.H., How does China censor the 
Internet?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-china-censors-internet; The Great 
Firewall: The art of concealment, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574631-chinese-
screening-online-material-abroad-becoming-ever-more-sophisticated. Further, 
Article 37 of the PRC Cyber Security Law, as a data-localization requirement, 
compels the operators of “critical information infrastructure” to store 
“individuals’ personal information or important data” within China. See PRC 
Cybersecurity Law, supra note 114, art. 37. Clearly, these rules and policies are 
contrary to the TPP.  
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/4
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Finally, it is important to point out that perception is not 
necessarily reality.  What the above discussions have demonstrated 
is that the TPP was perceived by many as a China-containment 
tool.  Containment may or may not work.  Empirical evidence 
about the containment policy adopted in other parts of the world 
submits that this policy hardly works.  For example, the U.S. 
embargo on Cuba, which started in the 1960s to bar Americans 
from trading with, investing in, or travelling to Cuba, has been 
described as a “half-century of failure.”115  In December of 2014, 
President Obama called for Congress to end the embargo, 
admitting that, while this policy “has been rooted in the best of 
intentions,” it “has had little effect.”116  With respect to the TPP, it 
is certainly open to doubt how much it could do to affect the 
Chinese economy.  Furthermore, to the extent there is any 
containment element in the TPP, it was a half-hearted policy since 
the U.S. was pursuing collaboration on trade with China through 
other channels while simultaneously excluding China from the 
TPP.  For instance, the U.S. and China engaged in formal 
negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) almost in 
tandem with the TPP negotiations.117 
B. Competitive Liberalization to Push China to Adopt Higher 
Standards? 
A different perspective that looks at the positive side of 
TPP’s impact on China asserts that the TPP can encourage 
“competitive liberalization” in trade policy, which shall eventually 
                                                          
115 Daniel Griswold, Dir., Ctr. for Trade Pol’y Stud. at the Cato Inst., 
Four Decades of Failure: the U.S. Embargo against Cuba, Speech Before the 
James A. Baker III Inst. Program (May 21, 2017) (transcript available on 
www.cato.org). 
116 Alan Rappeport, Obama Calls Cuba Embargo a Failure, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-
draft/2014/12/17/obama-calls-cuba-embargo-a-failure/. 
117 TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY 3 (Peterson Inst. Int’l 
Econ. 2015), https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/briefings/piieb15-
1.pdf (noting the talks for the U.S.-China BIT were launched in 2008 by the 
U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao). 
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drive China into the fair game of economic liberalization.  The 
concept of “competitive liberalization” denotes that free trade can 
be pursued as aggressively as possible at all three levels—bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral—simultaneously.118  Not only are all 
three pursuits mutually reinforcing, they also induce and encourage 
each other.  Thus, “an FTA can encourage movement in WTO 
negotiations, and vice versa.”119  Proponents argue that the TPP 
would enable the U.S. to shape the directions of international trade 
and investment at the following levels: 
 
[1] Encouraging market opening and 
economic reforms among TPP’s 
current members, particularly in 
emerging markets such as Malaysia 
and Vietnam; 
 
[2] Creating incentives for other 
Asia-Pacific nations to follow suit, to 
match the preferential access that 
TPP members would gain in major 
markets such as the United States 
and Japan; and 
 
[3] Addressing new trade barriers 
through new trade rules and 
disciplines, laying groundwork to 
influence and potentially spur future 
multilateral or plurilateral 
negotiations at the WTO or future 
                                                          
118 See generally C. Fred Bergsten, Competitive Liberalization and 
Global Free Trade: A Vision for the Early 21st Century (Inst. Int’l Econ., 
Working Paper No. 96-15, 1996), https://piie.com/publications/working-
papers/competitive-liberalization-and-global-free-trade-vision-early-21st. 
119 Raj Bhala, Competitive Liberalization, Competitive Imperialism, 
and Intellectual Property, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 77, 79 (2007). 
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FTA negotiations, and update critical 
gaps in existing trade rules. 120 
 
Thus, it is argued that instead of being anything to contain China, 
the TPP is simply a trade agreement to advance economic 
liberalization at regional level.  This argument goes by saying that 
China is not actually excluded from the TPP.  Rather, it is expected 
to join the agreement after, of course, the fundamental rules and 
principles are hammered out.  Even President Obama made an 
informal comment indicating that China could be open to 
eventually joining the TPP.121  
 
Responses from China suggested mixed feelings about the 
TPP.  As noted previously, on the one hand, viewed as an 
indispensable part of the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia” 
strategy, the TPP was received with widespread skepticism in 
China.122  Certain Chinese foreign economic policies, including the 
“FTA Strategy” and One Belt One Road initiative, appear to be 
                                                          
120 BROCK R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44361, THE 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 5 (2017). 
121 See Kai Ryssdal, President Obama says China open to joining trade 
partnership, MARKETPLACE (June 3, 2015, 9:55 AM), 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lia6pFnwNqYJ:https://
www.marketplace.org/2015/06/03/world/president-obama-talks-trade/president-
obama-says-china-open-joining-trade-&num=1&strip=1&vwsrc=0. Discussing 
China and the TPP in an interview with American business media Marketplace, 
President Obama said: “[T]hey’ve already started putting out of feelers about the 
possibilities of them participating at some point.” Id. 
122 See Wang, supra note 93. 
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have been strategic and geopolitics-driven.123  However, China’s 
official response to the conclusion of the TPP deal appeared cool 
and even neutral.  A spokesperson from the PRC Ministry of 
Commerce (“MOFCOM”) commented that “China always keeps 
an open mind toward the construction of systems that are in 
accordance with WTO rules and are helpful for promoting 
economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.”124  More 
significantly, China has embarked on economic reforms to 
experiment with new legal and regulatory environments—possibly 
due to pressure from the challenging rules of the TPP—to deal 
with the new trade and investment issues through its newly 
established Free Trade Zones (“FTZs”).  The new FTZ measures, 
some of which have already been codified into national laws and 
regulations, include lowered or zero tariffs, pre-establishment 
national treatment, “negative lists” for foreign investment, zero-
registered capital requirement, much simplified registration 
                                                          
123 As noted by the WTO, “the creation of [FTAs] cannot be fully 
understood without considering the political context within which they are 
formed.” See MARC BACCHETTA ET AL., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011: THE 
WTO AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: FROM CO-EXISTENCE TO 
COHERENCE 95 (2011). A World Bank report observed that “[regional 
integration is good politics: it meets] politics needs, such as security or enhanced 
bargaining power, and it satisfies influential lobbies.” See WORLD BANK, TRADE 
BLOCS 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). On the motivations behind China’s FTA 
approach, Jiangyu Wang has observed that “China’s [FTA] approach, as a 
strategic movement, must be viewed in a larger context that embraces both 
economic and geopolitical considerations, with the latter playing a relatively 
more important role at this stage.” See Jiangyu Wang, supra note 16, at 129. See 
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard & Colin Flint, The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk 
Road Initiative, GEOPOLITICS, Apr. 2017, at 223 & Charlie Campbell / Khorgos, 
Ports, Pipelines, and Geopolitics: China’s New Silk Road Is a Challenge for 
Washington, TIME (Oct. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4992103/china-silk-road-
belt-xi-jinping-khorgos-kazakhstan-infrastructure/, for the strategic and 
geopolitical dimensions of China’s One Belt One Road initiative.  
124 Shannon Tiezzi, What Does China Think of the TPP?, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Oct. 7, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/what-does-china-
think-of-the-tpp/ (quoting a MOFCOM spokesman); see also MOFCOM 
Spokesman comments on the conclusion of TPP negotiations, MINISTRY OF 
COM.: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201510/20151
001132863.shtml.   
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procedures for corporate establishment, liberalization of capital 
controls, and simplified customs clearance procedures, among 
other things.125  Although the FTZs still have much to prove, their 
establishment and the continuous promulgation of liberalization-
oriented rules might have attested to the effect of TPP-driven 
competitive liberalization. 
C. Post-TPP Asian Regionalism: ASEAN+6 (RECP) to FTAAP? 
One impact of the TPP on Asian regionalism is that the 
TPP adjourned the process for several years by diverting the 
interests and resources of some—but certainly not all—Asian 
countries from the original economic integration path.  As noted 
previously, Asian economic integration progressed on the ASEAN-
centered approach for years, beginning with the ASEAN-China 
FTA.  Although there was a debate about whether Asian 
regionalism should proceed on an ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 model, 
at least both models involve all of the major countries in Asia.  The 
TPP, in contrast, is an FTA between a minority of Asian 
economies and a few non-Asian countries.  In this sense, it is not 
even an Asian regionalism project.  In terms of regional economic 
integration, the TPP divided the Asians rather than joined them 
together.  
 
The withdrawal of the U.S. from the TPP has given Asian 
economies no other choice but revert to the ASEAN+X type of 
regionalism.  This time, the only politically feasible model seems 
to be the ASEAN+6 way, known now as the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”), the negotiations 
                                                          
125 Daniel Ren & Eric Ng, Beijing further relaxes rules on foreign 
investment in FTZs, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 19, 2016, 3:29 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1991765/beijing-further-
relaxes-rules-foreign-investment-ftzs. 
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for which are ongoing as of this writing.126  This mega trade pact 
aims to establish an integrated Pan-Asian market for half of the 
world population and a third of global GDP.127  With a vision of “a 
modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually-beneficial 
economic partnership agreement among the ASEAN Member 
States and ASEAN’s FTA partners,” the RCEP negotiations cover 
trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic and 
technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, legal and 
institutional matters, and other issues, presumably covering almost 
every aspect of the economy.128  Like the TPP, negotiations for the 
RCEP have been conducted with a high degree of secrecy.  It is 
widely believed that the RCEP, assuming it can be completed, will 
represent “shallow” rather than “deep” integration in trade 
regionalism. 
 
Much has also been said about the geopolitical aspect of the 
RCEP, largely because pro-TPP politicians in the U.S. used the 
                                                          
126 See Carmen Ho, RCEP offers hope after TPP leaves the table, 
ACCA GLOBAL (Apr. 1, 2017), 
http://www.accaglobal.com/sg/en/member/member/accounting-
business/2017/04/insights/rcep-tpp.html# (noting that “[w]ith the new US 
administration’s rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Asian economies are 
eyeing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership”); Yizhe (Daniel) 
Xie, The World Needs RCEP, E. ASIA FORUM (Apr. 25, 2017),  
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/04/25/the-world-needs-rcep/ (noting that, 
after the death of the TPP, “the world desperately needs a quick and big 
globalization win, and RCEP is the best possible choice”); see also Reuters 
Staff, China, Singapore seek to expedite RCEP trade talks, REUTERS (June 12, 
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-singapore-trade/china-singapore-
seek-to-expedite-rcep-trade-talks-idUSKBN1930RR (noting that “RCEP has 
been given new impetus by U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement”). 
127 See generally ASS’N OF S.E. ASIAN NATIONS, http://www.asean.org 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018), for information about RCEP at the ASEAN 
Secretariat’s website. 
128 MINISTRY OF TRADE & INDUS. SING, FACTSHEET: WHAT YOU NEED 
TO KNOW ABOUT REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP) 
1, https://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/SiteAssets/Pages/FACTSHEET-WHAT-
YOU-NEED-TO-KNOW- 
ABOUT/Factsheet%20on%20RCEP%20(June%202014).pdf (last updated June 
2014).  
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RCEP to push for the passage of TPP by the U.S. Congress.  
President Obama, referring to the RCEP in his own writing said: 
“China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up some of the 
fast-growing markets in the world at our expense, putting 
American jobs, businesses and goods at risk.”129  One 
commentator even characterized “TPP vs. RCEP” as a battle 
between America and China “for control of Pacific trade.”130  
 
In a working paper published by the Asian Development 
Bank (“ADB”), Shintaro Hamanaka contended that “TPP vs. 
RCEP” signified a battle for control of membership and agenda in 
regional integration groupings.131  Specifically, “the formation of 
regional integration and cooperation frameworks can be best 
understood as a dominant state’s attempt to create its own regional 
framework where it can exercise some exclusive influence.”132  In 
establishing its own regional system, the dominate/leader state 
plays two games simultaneously: control of membership and 
control of the agenda.  “The core of the first game is the exclusion 
of rivals.  The essence of the second game is to set the agenda that 
is convenient to the leader.”133  Hence, the essence of the politics 
of regional economic grouping is exclusion “because the exclusion 
of rival states is necessary for countries seeking to assume 
leadership.”134 
 
This theory may explain China’s intention to exclude the 
U.S. at the early stage of Asian regionalism, as discussed 
previously, and the notable exclusion of China from the TPP.  
                                                          
129 Obama, supra note 101.  
130 Gordon Chang, TPP vs. RCEP: America and China Battle for 
Control of Pacific Trade, NAT’L INT. (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-control-
pacific-trade-14021. 
131 Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership versus 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda 
Setting, (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 146, 2014), 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/152753/reiwp-146.pdf. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 4. 
134 Id. at 1. 
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However, it can hardly be relied upon to expound the political 
logic of RCEP.  The logic is simple.  In the RCEP, China controls 
neither the membership nor the agenda.  It is even submitted that, 
contrary to the prevailing rhetoric that it is a China-backed trade 
deal for balancing the TPP, the RCEP is simply an optional extra 
in China’s regional vision.  The relationship between China and 
the RCEP can be seen from three angles. 
 
First, the membership of the RCEP has never been 
determined by China, let alone any form of Chinese control.  As 
noted previously, the RCEP, in terms of its membership, represents 
exactly the ASEAN+6 model, which was the regional integration 
pattern proposed by Japan—and objected by China—in the early 
years of Asian regionalism.  
 
Second, contrary to the popular belief that the RCEP was a 
Chinese initiative in response to the upsurge of the TPP, it was 
actually a proposal of the ASEAN.  In 2012, a year after the TPP 
partners issued the TPP Leader Statement in which they agreed to 
the broad outlines of a high-standard trade agreement at the 2011 
APEC Leaders meeting, which marked the official start of the 
U.S.-led TPP negotiations, the ASEAN countries, driven by 
Indonesia, decided to launch the RCEP at the 21st ASEAN and 
Related Submits in Phnom, Cambodia.135  A year later, the 
negotiations for RCEP commenced.  China happily joined the 
RCEP negotiations not because it could be a tool to exclude the 
U.S., but because it saw this as an opportunity for it to overcome 
its exclusion from the TPP and, accordingly, the Asian economic 
integration process.  
 
                                                          
135 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Joint Declaration on 
the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (Nov. 20, 2012), http://asean.org/storage/2016/10/SEOM-AFPs-
Bali-Annex-4-Joint-Declaration-on-the-Launch-of-Negotiations-for-the-
RCEP.pdf. 
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Third, clearly the RCEP negotiations are championed by 
ASEAN, not by China.136  As the Philippine Daily Inquirer put it, 
“Southeast Asian nations will put priority on creating an Asia-
focused trade pact that includes China, India and Japan,” and they 
were glad that “[w]ith China putting its weight behind, RCEP has 
emerged as the best alternative to lowering tariffs in the region.”137  
However, as stated by the Philippine Trade Secretary Ramon 
Lopez: “All the countries are looking at what’s mutually beneficial 
for all, it won’t be lopsided, let’s say, in favor of China.  China is 
one of the participants.”138 
 
Although China indicated the intention to conclude a RCEP 
deal as quick as possible, it is not the major driving force behind 
the negotiations.  The reported difficulties and differences 
currently faced by RCEP negotiators hardly suggest that China is 
playing a leading role or serving even as a coordinator.  One of the 
major differences lies under the contest between China and Japan, 
as well as the suspicion of Chinese leadership in the negotiations. 
As the Financial Times reported: 
 
China is pushing for a rapid 
conclusion to the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, with a “low-quality” 
deal mainly focused on lowering 
tariffs between the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and its 
neighbours.  . . .  But officials in 
Japan and ASEAN insist RCEP 
should not be Chinese-led.  Beijing 
                                                          
136 See, e.g., ASEAN Pushes for Trade Pact; China Eyed, PHILIPPINE 
DAILY INQUIRER (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/philippine-daily-
inquirer/20170427/281492161207574 (noting the remarks of the Philippine 
Trade Secretary Ramon Lopez that “Southeast Asian countries this year will 
prioritise creating an Asia-focused trade pact that includes China, India and 
Japan, while trade issues with the United States will be put on the back burner”). 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
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wants to cast itself as a defender of 
global free trade for political reasons, 
they say, after the US quit another 
huge deal, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership.  Tokyo and Canberra 
want a high-quality RCEP deal 
covering services and investment—
half hoping this will bring the US 
back to the TPP table.139 
 
In addition, China’s ambition for an early deal must face 
the protectionist stance of India.  Interested in opening other 
countries’ services markets but reluctant to grant Chinese exporters 
lowered or zero tariff rates on manufactured products, India poses 
a major hurdle to the successful conclusion of any economically 
meaningful agreement.  
 
In short, the differences and difficulties, arising out of the 
distrust and different levels of economic development of RCEP 
partners, are likely to lead to the conclusion of a low-grade FTA, if 
an agreement can be reached at all.  But still, if completed, the 
RCEP will be a historically significant deal in terms of regional 
integration in Asia for the following reasons.  First, it will instill 
confidence in free trade and globalization.  The retreat from the 
TPP and resort to economic nationalism of the Trump 
Administration has tremendously undermined such confidence.  If 
the sixteen Asian countries, without the U.S., can reach a massive 
FTA, such as the RCEP, this will undoubtedly give the free traders 
a boost of motivation.  Second, even though the RCEP becomes an 
agreement for shallow integration, it can still “keep markets open, 
deepen economic integration and narrow the development gap 
                                                          
139 Robin Harding, Tom Mitchell & Michael Peel, China and Japan vie 
for control of Asia trade deal, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d34d324c-03d8-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9. 
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among the member states.”140  Importantly, as Rebecca Fatima Sta 
Maria put it, the RCEP model “may not be equivalent to the ‘gold 
standard’ that the TPP espoused to be, but it will provide a clear 
pathway toward that goal.”141  Further, the RCEP will provide a 
platform to consolidate all of the ASEAN+1 agreements, thus 
doing away the noodle-bowl effect to unifying the different rules 
of origin and other regulatory formalities.  Lastly, and probably 
most significantly, the RCEP will be the first Pan-Asia FTA to 
bring together all of the major economies in East, South, and 
Pacific Asia into an integrated market, with profound implications 
on the building of both a common Asian market and common 
Asian identity. 
 
In the long run, the exclusion of the U.S. and other Asia-
Pacific countries is not desirable, for both economic and 
geopolitical reasons.  Economically, Asian countries that do not 
currently have an FTA with the U.S. would always be keen on 
joining a mega-FTA in which the U.S. is a member, and that is 
probably the reason why they found the TPP appealing.  
Strategically, the sheer size of China’s economic and military 
might would make smaller Asian countries feel that strong U.S. 
involvement in Asia must be welcomed.142  In light of the recent 
developments in Asian regionalization, as discussed above, the 
concept of regional economic integration should not be 
geographically limited to Asia in the traditional geography.  
Instead, it should be Asia-Pacific in the long run, eyeing also 
countries in the Americas side of the Pacific.  The path to 
regionalism in this vast area is ineludibly the FTAAP, an 
agreement that covers possibly all of the Pacific Rim economies. 
 
                                                          
140 Rebecca Fatima Sta Maria, RCEP: More relevant than ever, 
JAKARTA POST (Feb. 20, 2017, 8:49 
AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/02/20/rcep-more-relevant-
now-than-ever.html. 
141 Id. 
142 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A 
QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT 232 (C.L. Lim, 
Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
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D. TPP and the Rule-Making in International Law: Implications for 
Future Trade Agreements and China’s Pursuit to Become a Rule-
Maker 
 
Even though the TPP as a trade agreement was abandoned 
by the U.S., it is still a significant instrument from the perspective 
of international economic law, and is already in the process of 
shaping the direction of the international economic order.  As 
noted by Hufbauer and Cimino-Isaacs, the two “mega regionals— 
[the TPP and TTIP]—will undoubtedly change the multilateral 
trading system.”143  This will be true even if both crash as formal 
FTAs, but “their negotiating objectives and ultimate stumbling 
blocks will shape the future of the WTO.”144  This is certainly not 
something that is very new in the history of the international 
economic system.  Pro-regionalism commentators have long 
argued that FTAs can be the stepping stone to multilateral trade 
liberalization.145  The proliferation of regional trade agreements 
may not only spur multilateral negotiations, but also create new 
rules which might eventually be ratified by the multilateral trading 
system.146  For example, “NAFTA’s achievements in the realms of 
intellectual property and services paved the way for new accords in 
the Uruguay Round in 1994.”147 
        
In the case of the TPP, for example, it has been suggested 
that the WTO—lagging so far behind BITs and FTAs on regulating 
investment—will eventually have to incorporate into its system the 
now widely accepted investment rules developed by the bilateral 
and regional deals regarding national treatment and pre-
establishment rights, negative-listing, compensation and 
expropriation, and the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, 
                                                          
143 Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, How will TPP and 
TTIP Change the WTO System?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 679 (2015).  
144 Id. 
145 MAURICE SCHIFF & ALAN WINTERS, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 221-23 (Melissa Edeburn & Nancy Levine eds., World Bank & 
Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
146 Id. at 229. 
147 Hufbauer & Cimino-Isaacs, supra note 143, at 696. 
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among others.148  This will be more obviously embedded in the 
ongoing negotiations among the 23 WTO members on the Trade in 
Services Agreement (“TiSA”), which currently excludes China’s 
participation.149  The overlapping of TiSA’s membership and 
objective with that of the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) will ensure that the TiSA is a 
high standard service agreement.  Given that the TiSA is the major 
forum for services negotiations under the umbrella of the WTO, it 
is highly likely that the rules of TiSA will be absorbed into the 
WTO if the multilateral trading system would have any progress 
on liberalization of service trades.150 
         
A wide range of the TPP rules, especially those WTO-plus 
provisions on further liberalization of trade and investment, are 
widely accepted and even embodied in China’s ongoing bilateral 
trade negotiations with existing and potential FTA partners.  At the 
very least, some of the TPP rules will become part of international 
economic law binding upon China by way of incorporation into 
China’s FTA deals, as well as an upgraded multilateral trading 
system.  
 
The success of the TPP in rule-making exemplifies the 
explicated strategy of the U.S. in using FTAs like the TPP to 
export American laws and make rules for the rest of the world.  As 
Barak Obama wrote in The Washington Post, “America should 
                                                          
148 Id. at 682. 
149 TiSA is said to cover about 70% of the global trade in services. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION FACTSHEET ON TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT 
(TISA) 2 (Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/september/tradoc_154971.doc.pdf. 
150 Hufbauer & Cimino-Isaacs, supra note 143, at 689. TiSA is a 
plurilateral agreement currently being negotiated by 23 WTO members of the 
WTO. The negotiations, conducted under the umbrella of the WTO, aim to 
further global liberalization of trade in services based on the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Trade in Services. TiSa is open to all WTO members, which 
“means that if enough WTO members join, TiSA could be turned into a broader 
WTO agreement and its benefits extended beyond the current participants.” See 
Trade in Services Agreement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/tisa/ (last visited March 28, 2018). 
 
45
ARTICLE 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2018  12:27 PM 
428 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 2N 
write the rules.  America should call the shots.  Other countries 
should play by the rules that America and our partners set, and not 
the other way around.”151  Monopolizing the rule-making power in 
international trade was the first strategic objective of the Obama 
Administration in promoting the TPP.152  As noted by Michael 
Froman, the last USTR in the Obama years, “[t]he Trans-Pacific 
Partnership presents an unprecedented opportunity to update the 
rules of the road.”153 
 
Obama’s rejection of allowing China any power to “write 
the rules,” however, touched a highly sensitive nerve in China, 
resulting in China’s recent painful chase of the “discursive power” 
in international affairs.154  The discursive power, or huayuquan, is 
defined, in part, as the power to create norms and make rules in 
international relations.155  A 2014 decision of the Chinese 
Communist Party called for national efforts to be made to:  
 
Vigorously participate in the 
formulation of international norms, 
promote the handling of foreign-
related economic and social affairs 
according to the law, strengthen our 
country’s discourse power and 
influence in international legal 
affairs, use legal methods to 
safeguard our country’s sovereignty, 
                                                          
151 Obama, supra note 101. 
152 Michael Froman, The Strategic Logic of Trade: New Rules of the 
Road for the Global Market, FOREIGN AFF. (2014), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/strategic-logic-trade. 
153 Id. 
154 See generally Kejin Zhao, Note, China’s Rise and Its Discursive 
Power Strategy, CHINESE POL. SCI. REV., Sept. 2016, at 539. 
155 Id. at 544 (noting that, in the Chinese understanding, discourse 
power includes, in part, a country’s ability to “operate politically” which is 
embodied in “agenda-setting, rule-making capacity and international 
mobilization ability”). 
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security and development 
interests.156 
 
In an article titled Geopolitics, International Discursive Power, 
and the Rule-Making Power in International Law,157 this author 
pointed out that, for a country to own the rule-making international 
discursive power, the following conditions must be met: (1) the 
hard power including economic—and military power if necessary 
—to influence other countries; (2) the soft power to develop 
ideology and discourse that are appealing to other countries; (3) the 
ability to create ideas as well as to process ideas into concrete rules 
and policies; (4) the possession of public media which can be used 
to communicate to the public at domestic and international level; 
and (5) the political will to pro-actively participate in international 
affairs.158  Using these criteria to evaluate China’s discursive 
power, the article made the following conclusion with respect to 
China’s rule-making ability at the international level: 
 
China’s discursive power in the 
international society is rather weak.  
First, China does not have the ability 
to develop ideas about international 
affairs, international situation and 
international relations, as well as to 
convert the ideas into systems of 
theories which can be used to 
analyze international issues.  The 
lack of the ability to produce ideas 
                                                          
156 Robert Williams, A New Vocabulary for Engagement in US-China 
Relations?, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 10, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-
new-vocabulary-for-engagement-in-us-china-relations/.  
157 See Wáng Jiāngyǔ (王江雨) [Wang Jiangyu], Dìyuán Zhèngzhì, 
Guójiā Huàyǔ Quán Yǔ Guójìfǎ Shàng de Guīzé Zhìdìng Quán (地缘政治，国
家话语权与国际法上的规则制定权) [Geopolitics, International Discursive 
Power, and the Rule-Making Power in International Law], 2 ZHŌNGGUÓ FǍLǛ 
PÍNGLÙN 39, 45 (2 中国法律评论 39, 45) [2 CHINA L. REV. 39, 45] (2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2970391. 
158 Id. at 42-43. 
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and theories stems from the low level 
of academic and policy research in 
China.  Second, China does not 
possess the ability to propose new 
international rules, or change or 
improve existing international rules.  
As widely known, the West has 
dominated international rule-making 
in the past several centuries.  Very 
few rules were proposed by non-
Western countries, including China.  
At the inception of the People’s 
Republic, it did propose some 
theories and doctrines in the 
international society, such as the 
“Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence,” the doctrine of the “Three 
Worlds,” etc., which, as discourse 
and analytical frameworks, generated 
significant impacts on the research 
and practice in international 
relations.  However, when China 
entered the age of taoguang yanghui 
(keeping a low profile and biding 
one’s time), it was more inclined to 
be a rule-taker rather than a rule-
maker at the international level.  
Furthermore, China tends to be 
indifferent to and keep a distance 
from those global affairs which it 
believes its own interests are not 
directly involved.  . . .  Third, the 
number of Chinese employees in 
international organizations is rather 
small, and very few of them hold 
decision-making or executive 
positions.  Fourth, China’s 
expressions in speaking about 
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international affairs and 
communicating its own position are 
rather difficult to be understood by 
their audience in the international 
society.  . . .  Lastly, but not least, 
China is seriously short of pubic 
media, which are regarded as 
reputable and credible at the 
international level.159 
 
To the extent the contest for rule-making power is an issue in U.S.-
China trade relations, it is a battle that China cannot win at this 
stage of its national development.  It may be able to resist and 
refuse to accept certain rules made by the U.S., but it does not have 
the ability to create a new system of rules for FTAs or any other 
area of the global economy, at least at this stage.  This explains 
why the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”) 
decided to adopt a high-standard governance structure that 
conforms to international best practice.160  This case suggests that, 
even though China is in possession of the power to make rules, it 
would choose to adopt the existing rules made by the West—
specifically the U.S.—rather than make a different set of rules of 
its own. 
IV. U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS IN THE POST-TPP/TRUMP 
ERA 
Bilateral trade relations between China and the U.S. are 
experiencing interesting times now, in ways full of mysterious 
surprises.  Donald J. Trump, in the campaigning months in 2016, 
                                                          
159 Id. at 43-44. 
160 Zhōu Xiāoxiāo, Zhèng Qīngtíng & Wáng Léishēng (周潇枭;郑青亭
;王雷生) [Zhou Xiaomiao, Zheng Qingting & Wang Leisheng], Yà Tóuxíng 
Kāiyè: Dǎzào Gāo Biāozhǔn Zhìlǐ Jiégòu de Duōbiān Jīgòu (亚投行开业：打
造高标准治理结构的多边机构) [AIIB Opens: Building a High-Standard 
Governance Structure for a Multilateral Institution], 21ST CENTURY ECON. DAILY 
(Zhang Xing ed., Jan. 19, 2016), http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2016-
01/19/content_29341.htm. 
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vigorously attacked China's “unfair trade practices” and almost 
labeled China as America’s economic enemy No.1.161  He vowed 
to nominate China as a currency manipulator immediately after he 
became President.162  Having been in the White House for more 
than a year, Trump, however, has not adopted anything policy-wise 
or institutionally to dramatically alter the status quo of U.S.-China 
trade relations.  On the other side, China remained rather cool in 
dealing with Trump, generating an impression that it has the will 
and capacity to face up to any challenges from the U.S. side, but is 
still willing to talk with U.S. leaders about bilateral trade issues.  
Suddenly, China and the U.S. announced a 100-day plan to 
improve their strained trade ties at the Xi-Trump Summit in 
Florida in early April of 2017.163  It was positively confirmed that 
the 100-day, surprisingly proposed by the Chinese side, is aimed to 
reduce China’s trade surplus with the U.S., for which China also 
proposed unilateral economic concessions.164  However, the threats 
of trade war between the two countries have always been looming 
in U.S.-China relations in recent years.165  
 
                                                          
161 See Trump accuses China of ‘raping’ US with unfair trade policy, 
BBC NEWS (May 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-
36185012; see also Keith Bradsher, In China-U.S. Trade War, Trump Would 
Have Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/business/international/trump-china-us-
trade-war.html. 
162  Doug Palmer & Ben Schreckinger, Trump vows to declare China a 
currency manipulator on Day One, POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/donald-trump-china-currency-
manipulation-215679.  
163 See Andrew Galbraith & Dominique Patton, U.S.-China trade talks 
sputtering at 100-day deadline, REUTERS (July 16, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade/u-s-china-trade-talks-
sputtering-at-100-day-deadline-idUSKBN1A109V. 
164 Id. 
165 See John Authers, China bulls should be worried their view is now 
the consensus, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/589e9880-fb8d-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167; America, 
China and the risk of trade war, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21715656-trade-
tensions-will-mount-destructive-trade-war-can-still-be.  
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Seen in a broader context, the bedrock of U.S.-China trade 
relations is undergoing critical and fundamental changes.  In the 
several decades since the two countries revived their trade relations 
in the 1970s, bilateral trade between the two had several distinctive 
features.  First, for the U.S., trade with China was not only about 
trade.  Instead, it was part of the America’s grand strategy to 
engage China, bring China into the Western dominated 
international order, and promote economic liberalization, 
marketization, and even political reform within China.166  Second, 
the U.S. was largely a true believer, protector, and faithful 
practitioner of free trade, and promoter of globalization.167  Third, 
the U.S. opened its markets to China in exchange for China’s 
acceptance of American leadership in the world, especially in the 
Asia Pacific.168  On the Chinese side, starting from a low basis, 
economic liberalization and marketization progressed steadfastly 
and solidly for many years.169  For the above reasons, the U.S. 
demonstrated “strategic forbearance” of formal and informal 
                                                          
166 See Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, The China Reckoning: How 
Beijing Defied American Expectations, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./April, 2018, at 60, 
62 (noting that generations of U.S. presidents and officials believed that 
“[g]reater commercial interaction with China was supposed to bring gradual but 
steady liberalization of the Chinese economy” and that “debt, inefficiency, and 
the demands of a more advance economy would necessitate further reforms”). 
167 See generally G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE 
ORIGINS, CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2012); see also John Ikenberry, The Future of the Liberal 
World Order: Internationalism after America, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 56 (2011). 
168 See generally G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of and the Future of the 
West: Can the Liberal System Survive? 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (2008). 
169 See generally SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC 
REFORM IN CHINA (1993) (discussing China’s economic reform); ORVILLE 
SCHELL & DAVID SHAMBAUGH, THE CHINA READER: THE REFORM ERA (1999) 
(same); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(2011) (same); C. FRED BERGSTEN, CHARLES FREEMAN, NICHOLAS R. LARDY & 
DEREK J. MITCHELL, CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
(Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ. 2008) (same); DOUG GUTHRIE, CHINA AND 
GLOBALIZATION (Routledge 2006) (same). 
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economic and trade policies and restrictions in China, which the 
U.S. believes to be “unfair trade practices.”170 
 
The ascendancy of President Trump in American politics 
indicates that the fundamentals of the U.S.-China trade relations 
are to be changed, fundamentally in some areas at least.  Two such 
changes are happening.  First, a new consensus is being formed in 
Washington, which holds largely the following view about U.S.-
China relations:  
 
Because the American effort to 
‘integrate’ China into the liberal 
international order has now 
generated new threats to U.S. 
primacy in Asia—and could result in 
a consequential challenge to 
American power globally—
Washington needs a new grand 
strategy toward China that centers on 
balancing the rise of Chinese power 
rather than continuing to assist its 
ascendancy.171 
 
That is, the policy elites in the U.S. increasingly believe that their 
country should give up the naïve idea of “peaceful transformation” 
through which China would someday become a democratic market 
economy and a responsible stakeholder in the international system 
dominated by the U.S.  Instead, it should view China as a 
competitor, rivalry, and enemy if necessary, and abandon the 
“strategic forbearance” of illegal or unfair Chinese behaviors. 
 
                                                          
170 See Campbell & Ratner, supra note 166, at 62-63 (noting that the 
U.S. engaged China while “Beijing has resisted pressure from Washington and 
elsewhere to level the playing field for foreign companies”). 
171 ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & ASHLEY J. TELLIS, COUNCIL SPECIAL 
REPORT NO. 72, REVISING U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA 4 (Council 
on Foreign Rel. Press 2015), https://www.cfr.org/report/revising-us-grand-
strategy-toward-china. 
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The second change is the rise of economic nationalism in 
the U.S. represented by the election of the populist candidate 
Donald Trump as the American President.  President Trump 
openly condemned free trade in his inaugural address by saying: 
“We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries 
making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our 
jobs.  Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”172  
Shortly after he took office, he pulled the U.S. out of the TPP,173 
signaled his Administration’s intention to bypass WTO decisions 
when necessary,174 issued a new “Buy American, Hire American” 
                                                          
172 Donald J. Trump, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the Inaugural 
Address (Jan. 20, 2017) (transcript available on www.whitehouse.gov). 
173 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United 
States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, Donald 
J. Trump, President of the United States, The White House (Jan. 23, 2017) (on 
file with WhiteHouse.gov). 
174 See, e.g., Evelyn Cheng, To get tough on China, Trump may throw 
out the trade rulebook, CNBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/05/trade-with-china-trump-may-get-tough-by-
bypassing-the-wto.html; Shawn Donnan & Demetri Sevastopulo, Trump team 
looks to bypass WTO dispute system, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/7bb991e4-fc38-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30. 
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executive order,175 and threatened to launch trade wars with trading 
partners like China and Germany.176  
 
China, the country with which the U.S. has the largest trade 
deficit, realized that it must manage U.S.-China relations, 
including trade issues, with great caution during the Trump era.  
That possibly explains why President Xi Jiping was willing to offer 
unilateral concessions to address the trade imbalance between 
China and the U.S.  This approach, it is submitted, might only 
suppress the symptom without treating the condition, or, in 
Chinese words, zhibiao bu zhiben.  Truthfully, trade and economic 
policies in both the U.S. and China have contributed to the 
imbalance.  In the U.S., it is the over-spending and over-borrowing 
problems.  In China, it is the lack of progress in economic reform.  
China became the world’s second largest economy in 2010,177 but 
economic reform has stalled for years.  That is, the many 
                                                          
175 Exec. Order No. 13788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 18, 2017).  
176 See Shawn Donna, Trump’s top trade adviser accuses Germany of 
currency exploitation, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/57f104d2-e742-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539; Ana 
Swanson, Trump lashes out at Germany’s Trade Practice – and he may have a 
point, WASH. POST (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/05/30/trump-lashes-out-
at-germanys-trade-practices-and-he-may-have-a-
point/?utm_term=.b24752ecb91f; Der Spiegel Staff, Donald Trump’s Attack on 
German Prosperity, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2018) 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/donald-trump-trade-war-theatens-
germany-and-europe-a-1197357.html; see also Michael Nienaber, Germany, 
China warn Trump tariff moves threaten global trade, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-germany/germany-china-
warn-trump-tariff-moves-threaten-global-trade-idUSKCN1GN0BQ; Keith B. 
Richburg, Does Trump Even Have an Endgame on Trade War with China, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 7, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/business/article/2140661/does-trump-even-have-endgame-trade-war-china; 
China ‘not afraid’ of trade war with Trump, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018),  
https://www.ft.com/content/11416168-3948-11e8-8b98-2f31af407cc8; Xi 
Jinping warns against ‘arrogance’ amid threat of trade war with US, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/10/xi-
jinping-warns-against-arrogance-amid-threat-of-trade-war-with-us. 
177 David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second Largest Economy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at B1.  
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restrictions maintained in the economy, which constraints both 
foreign and domestic private business, do not match China’s 
developmental stage and its status as a global economic power. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Regional economic integration/trade regionalism in Asia 
started at the outset of this century.  Although regional integration 
makes great economic sense for Asian countries, it has progressed 
rather slowly.  China-Japan competition for regional leadership 
plagued the beginning stage of economic regionalization in East 
Asia.  The rise of the TPP suspended the internal regionalization 
process in Asia, and its demise—or the abandonment of it by the 
Trump Administration—offers an opportunity for Asian countries 
to revive Asia’s own regional integration projects, currently in the 
form of the negotiations for the RCEP, which is more likely to be a 
trade pact for shallow integration.  
 
Several brief conclusions can be drawn from this Article’s 
discussions.  First, unconstrained power rivalry can be a permanent 
curse for Asia’s economic integration, if the key players in the 
region, including U.S., China, and Japan, always intend to exclude 
each other from the integration process.  Asian regionalism must 
adopt an inclusive approach; otherwise it will never succeed.  
Significantly, any integration process should be open to both China 
and the U.S.  A regionalization project without China will divide 
Asia.  If such a project purposefully excludes the U.S., it will be 
wrecked by geopolitics.  In this sense, the RCEP might be a low-
grade agreement if ever reached, but it will still be a landmark 
agreement in the history of Asian regionalism because it is the first 
trade pact that brings almost all of the economies in the region 
together.  In the long run, however, regional integration should go 
beyond Asia to include the economies on the other side of the 
Pacific, especially the U.S.  The FTAAP is thus an avenue in this 
sense, with both economic and strategic significance, to realize 
Asia-Pacific economic integration. 
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Second, the TPP was believed to be a geo-political tool to 
contain China in Obama’s “rebalance to Asia” strategy.  However, 
it has also generated “competitive liberalization” effects, pushing 
China to deepen its domestic economic reform as well as to engage 
its trading partners on more friendly terms.  
 
Third, although the TPP was deserted by the Trump 
administration, it is still a landmark instrument for the making of 
international economic law.  The cutting-edge rules made in the 
TPP laid a solid foundation for the development of high-standard 
template agreements for FTAs of next generation.  Many of those 
rules are likely to be incorporated into the multilateral trading 
system if the WTO is upgraded to a second version.  Consequently, 
China should understand that the death of the TPP does not amount 
to the end of TPP rules.  It must prepare itself for meeting the high-
standards of TPP-style agreements at some point in the future. 
 
Fourth, the landscape of U.S.-China trade relations has 
fundamentally changed, symbolized by the intensified Chinese 
effort to pursue global leadership and the rise of “America First” 
policy with the election of President Trump.  The “strategic 
forbearance” in U.S.-China relations is fading away, and the U.S. 
will demand more unilateral concessions from China, which has 
economically benefited from trading with the U.S.  The trade 
relationship between the world’s two largest economies does not 
need to be reset, but structural changes might have to be carried 
out to further liberalize the Chinese market, as well as curtail the 
over-spending in the U.S.  In addition, China and U.S. should work 
to rebuild confidence between them.  This would require leaders of 
the two countries to seriously consider the following: (1) what they 
want from each other; (2) what international order they want to 
live in; and (3) what their shared responsibility to the world is. 
 
To conclude, if there is anything this author can 
recommend for improving the China-U.S. trade relations, it would 
be the following two advices.  First, China should embark on a 
new wave of economic liberalization, opening its markets wider to 
both domestic private sectors and foreign business.  Second, the 
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two countries should begin to consider the negotiations for a U.S.-
China FTA.  Such an FTA is doomed to be difficult and 
complicated, but the advantages it can offer cannot be paralleled 
by any other arrangement.  Such an agreement—and even the 
negotiation for it—can be used by the U.S. to pry open the Chinese 
market.  On the Chinese part, it can be used to push for domestic 
reform, as the WTO did for China in the 1990s.  
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